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ABSTRACT: This paper examined the new security 
challenge of ECOWAS forty years after its formation 
and ECOWAS changing role to conflict and security 
issues. Her recent interventions; Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Cote d’Ivoire, were areas ECOWAS invested heavily 
on security and peace mediation. Economic Community 
Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) intervene in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, militarily to 
restore order. Additionally, the manifestation of 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Mali’s Ansar ud deen and the 
Movement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de 
l’Ouest (MUJAO), threatening regimes security in 
Nigeria, Niger, and Mali, as well as in Chad and 
Cameroon. This conceptual paper highlights the role of 
ECOWAS and ECOMOG in peace enforcement and 
restoration of order in conflict areas in west Africa, and 
looked into the growing nature of terrorism in west 
Africa. The paper recommends that, ‘ECOMOG model’ 
be adequately re-structured to a standby force to 
safeguard the sub-region from the emerging terrorism 
activities in the sub-region. 
Keywords: Conflict, Intervention, ECOWAS, 
ECOMOG, What next? 
INTRODUCTION 
The group of fifteen (15) countries from West 
Africa, ECOWAS is the largest economic group in 
the west African sub-region. It is an organization 
that was given birth to as back as 1975, with the 
aim of integrating the economies of member states 
for common sustainability and development of the 
sub-region, foster relations among members’ state 
and contribute to the growth and development of 
the Africa continent. Since the end of the cold war, 
the ECOWAS sub region was caught up in 
different crisis, ranging from inter-ethnic conflicts, 
political conflicts etc. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
cote d’lvoire, were countries badly affected by 
crises since in the 1990’s. These conflicts posed a 
threat to the economic integration agenda of 
ECOWAS, and threaten the stability of the region. 
ECOWAS, then develops an internal regional 
conflict mediation and peace keeping strategies to 
address violent conflicts within the sub-region, 
thereby shifting from her traditional principles of 
non-interference to that of intervention by creating 
a sub-regional military group, ECOMOG to restore 
peace in all conflicting zone. This paper, is aimed 
at examining the challenges of the ECOWAS 
fourty years after creation, and argued that, after 
the various conflicts which the ECOWAS 
addressed right from the 1990’s, that the next 
challenge of the regional economic bloc is the 
threat of terrorism.  
ECOWAS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
“In a clear departure from the traditional principle 
of non-interference,” (Abass, 2000:1) to that of 
intervention, ECOWAS developed a mechanism 
for conflict resolution peacekeeping and security in 
her revised treaty, which comes into effect in July 
1993. This mechanism provides the resolution of 
the member states to cooperate with the community 
in establishing and strengthening appropriate 
mechanism for a timely prevention and resolution 
of conflict in the sub region. This brought about the 
protocol on conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security on the 10
th
 
of December 1999, in Togo. Among other things, 
the protocol calls for the establishment of 
ECOWAS Standing Force (ESF) to meet the 
security needs of the sub-region. 
The coming of this protocol on board signifies a 
shift from the sub-regional erstwhile posture of 
non-interference, to that of collective security from 
within the operational means of collective action. 
This is because the commencement of 
multilateralism has replaced non-interference as a 
means of conflict resolution. It is in that light that 
ECOWAS made a bold attempt to intervene in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, which has 
demonstrably justified that the peacekeeping and 
enforcement of peace processes are achieved from 
within its initiatives for intervention within the sub-
region. Although, there were administrative cum 
legal strife’s that come with their initial bold 
initiatives, and with all the fracas that manifested in 
the relations between the Anglo-phone and the 
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Francophone states, the problems are surmountable 
and positive approach to transforming the 
ECOMOG Model to that of ECOWAS standing 
force is not only necessary, but very diplomatically 
achievable. 
 
If despite the language barrier, the differences in 
ethnic composition of the members’ states, 
ECOMOG succeeded in addressing the post-cold 
war security challenge, it is therefore conceivable 
for the ECOWAS to forge ahead and tackle other 
challenging issues within the sub region to address 
the security challenges and the eminent greater 
challenge of terrorism in the west African sub-
region. One way to do this, is the transformation of 
the ECOMOG, a combined West African force, 
(Herbert, 1996) into a full-fledged military standing 
military force that can work towards achieving 
peace and its enforcement where ever there is a 
breach of such. This is tangibly achievable within 
the existing frame work of the revised charter of 
the ECOWAS community. This can provide and 
prepare ground for confronting the eminent 
challenges of terrorism within the sub-region. 
SUB-REGIONAL PEACE INITIATIVE 
Peacekeeping operations were built up by the 
chapters VI, VII and VIII of the United Nations. 
The UN Charter does not include a definition of 
peacekeeping operations. The lack of definition 
cause trouble about the limits of peacekeeping, but 
at the same time provides a wide capacity for 
peacekeeping to deal with different kinds of threats 
to international peace and security (Tsagourias, 
2006) however, Cox, argues that, the constitutional 
basis of the UN peacekeeping operations is the 
“broad mandate” of Article 1 of the Charter” 
(Katherine, 1999). Literally, in the Charter the first 
purpose of the UN is described as maintaining 
international peace and security, and to that end, to 
take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace. 
When the first peacekeeping operation was 
established, the former UN Secretary- General Dag 
Hammarskjold described peacekeeping operations 
as “Chapter Six and a Half”, falling conceptually 
between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the 
Charter. As time went by, the UN capabilities on 
peace keeping got to the limit, and encourages 
regional groups to partake in peace keeping 
engagement to compliment the UN efforts. M. A 
Vogt, captures the post-cold war peace keeping 
issues with the UN, pointing that; 
“between 1989 and…1996 
the United Nations has 
been involved in 21 Peace- 
Keeping Operations.  
Besides, the phenomenal 
growth in number, the 
nature of these operations 
has also changed from 
being mainly interstate 
conflicts requiring in 
many cases 
multifunctional Peace 
Keeping operations… 
Since the Peace keeping 
capabilities of the 
organization are being 
stretched to the limit there 
has immediately arisen the 
question of selectivity on 
the grounds that the 
organization cannot be 
involved in all cases” 
(Vogt and Aminu, 1996: 
xiv) 
Article VIII of UN charter authorizes regional grou 
ps embarking on collective security, under 
backings of UN Security Council, and coming in 
response to a contingency endangering 
International Peace and Security. Charter VIII, 
articles 52, (1), (2), (3) and article 54 as follows:  
Article 52 notes that; 
Nothing in the 
present chapter 
precludes the 
existence of regional 
arrangements or 
agencies for dealing 
with such matters 
relating to the 
maintenance of 
international peace 
and security as one 
appropriate for 
regional action 
provided that such 
arrangements or 
agencies and their 
activities are 
consistent with the 
purpose and 
principles of the 
United Nations. 
  
2. The members of the 
United Nations 
entering such 
arrangements or 
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constituting such 
agencies shall make 
every effort to 
achieve pacific 
settlement of local 
disputes, through 
such regional 
arrangements or such 
regional agencies 
before referring them 
to the Security 
Council. 
  
The Security Council 
should encourage 
pacific settlements of 
dispute through such 
regional 
arrangements or by 
such regional 
agencies either on 
the initiative of the 
state concerned or by 
reference from the 
Security Council. 
Article 54; 
The Security Council 
shall at all times be 
kept fully informed 
of activities 
undertaken or in 
contemplation under 
regional 
arrangements or by 
regional agencies for 
the maintenance of 
international peace 
and security. 
From the above therefore, the relentless quest for 
peace through the resolutions of conflict in the west 
African sub-region had a theoretical and ‘legal 
backing’ of the United Nations policy framework. 
The ECOMOG model of peace keeping coming 
right after the end of the cold war is in line with the 
general philosophy of the UN peace enforcement 
drive. The ECOMOG was helpful in ensuring, 
“peace making and peacekeeping missions” in 
Liberia (1990 - 1997), Sierra Leone (1998 - 2000), 
and Guinea-Bissau (1998 - 1999), (Belmakki, 
2005) are examples of the regional initiative (as 
provided by Chapter VIII of the UN) for conflict 
resolutions worked. 
If such regional initiatives work with multilateral 
efforts of the member state, what then stops the 
ECOWAS from initiating a viable multilateral 
action to face the raising challenges of terrorism in 
west Africa recently? With the activities of the 
Boko Haram in northern part of Nigeria, the Ansar 
ud deen and the Movement pour l’unicité et le 
jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) in Mali, 
which really threatens regime security in these west 
African states, what stops ECOWAS from facing 
the problem head-on? It is evidently clear, that 
religious fundamentalism and issues of terrorism, is 
the newest most formidable challenge of ECOWAS 
as a group. 
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT  
Multilateralism or the theory of Collective action, 
has been increasingly accepted in the post-cold war 
political relations. Over the last few decades, 
nations have come to realize that the challenges of 
security, peacekeeping, disease control, human 
rights violations, and pollution, among others, are 
too vast and complex for any nation or group of 
nations, no matter how powerful, to effectively 
manage on its own (Powell, 2003). Although the 
concept was vague during the cold war because of 
the rigidity of bi-polarism, many nations subscribed 
to the concept, which seems to exist even beyond 
the balance of power years in relations among 
states in the international system. 
Wang opined that “states are embedded in dense 
networks of transnational and international social 
relations that shape their perceptions of the world 
and their role in the world. States are socialized to 
want certain things by the international society in 
which they and the people in them live” (Wang, 
2000). Multilateralism after the cold war 
strategically place the global political relations in 
an equilibrium. For Powell, have rightly observed 
that, if nations will collectively come together to 
address issues that are vital for global peace, 
stability and concern, is far better than allowing 
any one state to do it. Individualism may be faced 
with challenges of resources, capability, design and 
competence. It is evident that, multilateralism has 
gained renewed salience in International Relation 
(Wang, 2000). 
John Gerard Ruggie, aptly captured what he termed 
as the institution of multilateralism. He asserted 
that the "institution of multilateralism" in his recent 
article entitled "Multilateralism: The Analysis of an 
Institution." Going by this definition, 
Multilateralism, here as an institution consisting of 
three principles: (1) indivisibility, (2) non-
discrimination, or generalized organizing 
principles, and (3) diffuse reciprocity. By this 
illustration, “Indivisibility is illustrated by 
“collective security arrangements” wherein an 
attack on one is considered an attack on all. Non-
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discrimination implies that all parties be treated 
similarly, as in the use of most favoured nation 
(MFN) status in trade agreements. Diffuse 
reciprocity implies that states do not rely on 
specific, quid-pro-quo exchanges, but on longer-
term assurances of balance in their relation (Martin, 
1992). Within the context of this paper, however, 
multilateral action is also in line with the collective 
action, collective responsibility and common 
security arrangement as pointed out by Ruggie 
(1993) and (Martin, 1992). in summary, the idea of 
collective security is simple, challenging and fresh. 
It is serving as the international police for the 
international community, and enforce law and 
order within the society. If the single individual is 
vulnerable or endangered in the society, he turns to 
the lawful agents of society for law enforcement 
(Thompson, 1953; p.755)  
Applying this perspective of multilateralism theory, 
on the multilateral action taken by ECOWAS, to 
this paper, the bold attempt taken by ECOMOG in 
the west African region from the beginning of the 
1990’s, the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea Bissau, was within the framework of 
multilateral action. ECOWAS, though with some 
little challenges, could enforce peace and 
encourage democratisation within the crises ridden 
area and the community. The application of 
Collective action, via collective security 
mechanism “as the main legal framework within 
the sub-regional organisation's involvement in 
collective security” (John, 2012; p.18) was 
instrumental to the stoppage of the conflicts in west 
Africa.  
On this premise therefore, the terrorism threats 
within west Africa, can strategically be handled 
through the collective actions of regional groups, as 
exemplified by the ECOWAS, using ECOMOG as 
a model for peace enforcement. The workability of 
the ECOMOG model to end violent conflicts in 
troubles spots in west Africa, is a headway for 
ushering in a mega collective security action 
within, to challenge terrorism in the west African 
sub-region. 
CONFLICTS IN WEST AFRICAN STATES 
West Africa states witnessed series of conflicts, 
since after independence from the 1950s. Most 
states therein, have seen civil wars (Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast), coups d’état 
(Gambia, Niger, Guinea) as well as ethnic and 
religious clashes (Benin, Nigeria, Mali) since after 
independence. While it is very difficult to pin point 
at specific reason for these conflicts and wars, 
poverty, political despotism, corruption and 
external interference have turned ‘the dreams of an 
economically integrated and politically united West 
Africa into a living nightmare for most of its 
citizens’ (Adebajo, 2002: 39). 
While Jackson, opines that, the accumulation of 
political, economic, structural, historical and 
cultural factors can be attributed to causes of 
conflict in west Africa (Jackson, 2006: 22) and 
Williams observed, that no any single element to 
blame fundamentally as a factor, (Wiliams, 2011: 
5) it is evident however, that misgovernance 
certainly makes way for corruption, greed and 
nepotism, thereby creating weak administrative 
structures and politically docile regimes, which in a 
long time open up for many social ills to set in. 
West Africa saw an increase in conflict in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, except for the Brutal Biafran 
civil war in Nigeria and the endemic violence in 
Chad, West Africa saw the crises in Senegal in the 
1980’s and particularly the upsurge of violence in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea – Bissau in the 
1990’s. In the year 2000, this pattern continues 
with inter linked conflicts. Wars in Africa are 
increasingly becoming regionalised. 
THE SHIFT TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
The West African sub-region managed conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’ivoire, Guinea, and 
now Mali, all through a regional collaborative 
effort. ECOMOG a product of the West African 
inter-state collaborations, come into effect to 
manage conflicts and wars within the region, in 
other to achieve peace and economic progress 
which is the fundamental reason of coming 
together for economic cooperation. The birth of 
The Economic Community of West Africa States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), confirms 
ECOWAS departure from non-interference 
principles erstwhile respected and uphold by the 
group. The collective security action by ECOWAS 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau has 
redefined the security arrangement in west Africa. 
ECOMOG came at a time when there was a 
conflict in Liberia, and the international community 
did not respond to this post-cold war conflict in 
Liberia, by sending either UN troops or any peace 
mission. 
Humanitarian concerns and the likely multiplier 
effects that would arose from the refugee issues, as 
foreseen by ECOWAS member states, coming 
from Liberian, was the sole reason that brought 
about the creation of ECOMOG. The member-
states states from the sub-region contributed troops 
and resources under the Nigerian initiative and 
maximal contribution to the ECOMOG project. 
Although many internal politics within the group 
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that in many ways seems to undermined the 
efficacy on the impact the ECOMOG in 
multilateral adventure could be addressed, “the 
problems encountered and lessons learned in the 
various ECOWAS peacekeeping operations led to 
the initiation of a process meant to improve future 
interventions,” (Kabia, 2013:179) for it is obvious 
that, the overriding interest of humanitarian 
concerns enable the ECOMOG to handle and 
decisively deal with the carnage in Liberia. So also, 
when there was military interregnum in sierra 
Leone, and political/electoral upsurge in Cote 
d’Ivoire, the same ‘ECOMOG model’ was 
deployed to address the conflicts that arouse as the 
result of the political crises within. 
The ECOMOG, after her engagement in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, became a model for collective 
security action under the authority and command 
of the ECOWAS leadership and financial 
commitments. The ECOMOG Model have the 
capacity to be converted into a sub-regional 
conflict prevention force, looking at the 
contribution it made to enforcing peace, restoration 
of order and bringing about stability within the sub 
region. 
 
Table 1: PREVIOUS WEST AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
S/N COUNTRY 
OCCUPIED 
DATE FORCE 
STRENGTH 
MANDATE 
1 Mali January, 2013 6,300 Men Drive Away the Islamist 
2 Guine-Bissau May, 2012 600 * Public figures and Institutions 
3 Liberia I August 1990 20,000 Peacekeeping; restoring order 
4 Liberia II 1997 5,794 Disarmament & Peace 
enforcement 
5 Sierra Leone 1997/1998 11,000 Restoring Democratically elected 
government after coup 
6 Ivory Coast January, 2003 1,300 Restore order After Military 
Rebellion  
*This number consist of the Police and other para military groups deployed from the states in west Africa 
Source: Research Survey, January 2017. 
The table puts in summary the military and other 
paramilitary personnel that partake in various 
military Interventions in west Africa, using the 
ECOMOG and under the purview of the 
ECOWAS. 
TERRORISM: NEW SECURITY THREATS 
IN WEST AFRICA 
 The concept of terrorism is very elusive, thereby 
making it “a highly-contested concept. It is 
therefore ‘flexibly constructed’ to suit ideological, 
nationalist, propagandist and political objectives” 
(Obi, 2006:90). Defining it in many situations tend 
to spark another argument entirely because of the 
political and cultural context attach to the concept. 
But the does not mean one will not have a 
‘convincing’ working definition of the term. Using 
a situational context, Coardy, defines it as an 
“organized use of violence to attack non-
combatants or innocents (in a special sense) or their 
property for political purposes”. (Coady, 2004:772) 
Howard, opines that, both “Terrorists and 
insurgents are organized around different agendas 
and maintain varied objectives, and yet, their 
actions, and use of terror as a strategy, are nearly 
identical” (Howard, 2010:966). While the act of 
terrorism takes many different perspectives, it 
primarily “occurs both in the context of violent 
resistance to the state as well as in the service of 
state interest” (Crenshaw, 1981)  
 After the post 9/11 attack in the us, Obi (2006), 
opines that in a globalised world, it is possible for 
terrorism to happen in west Africa he conceives it 
as “Although no terrorist strike has occurred in 
West Africa (unlike East and North Africa), 
security strategists, scholars and policymakers are 
concerned that, given historical and cultural factors 
and the political instability, poverty, socio-
economic and governance crises and conflicts that 
have ravaged the region, it could be potentially 
vulnerable to terrorism. Of particular note are the 
‘networked wars’ of the 1990s that ravaged Liberia 
and Sierra Leone and involved neighbouring states, 
and the outbreak of civil war in Guinea-Bissau 
between 1998 and 1999 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 
2002 (Obi,2006:88). 
In west Africa, Nigeria, Niger and Mali have 
witness many radical attack, which many scholar’s 
views as the upsurge of Islamism Terrorism 
(Walther, & Christopoulos, 2015:497) in west 
Africa. Although, “Islamic Terrorism” within west 
African continent was a myth and therefore 
contestable (Dowd, & Raleigh, 2013). Basically 
because; 
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 “First, it is purported 
that violent Islamist 
groups on the continent 
form part of a single, 
monolithic, globalized 
Islamist threat. Second, 
the globalized Islamist 
threat is taken to be a 
danger for the West and 
Western interests 
primarily, and African 
stability only 
secondarily. Third, 
ungoverned territories 
are assumed to provide a 
safe haven for 
extremism, and Africa is 
seen as set to become 
the new theatre in which 
violent Islam will 
flourish”. (Dowd, & 
Raleigh, 2013:499) 
However, “authorities have been forced to 
conclude that Islamic terrorism in Mali is a reality” 
(Walther & Christopoulos, 2012) He argued further 
that, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
militants” and the Tuareg rebels, acting as their 
“local affiliates” are active in the major cities and 
roads across the northern half of the country. 
However, drove the Malian army out of the largest 
desert in the world, leading to the partition of Mali 
(Walther & Christopoulos, 2012:2). Their existence 
is not even debatable, as there exists a substantial 
number of literature, with reference to their 
evolution in Africa and particularly the Sahel and 
the Maghreb. (Ellis 2004; Keenan 2004a; 2004b; 
Lyman and Morrison 2004). 
“Justified as 
part of the ‘war 
on terrorism’, 
the United 
States has 
increased its 
presence in 
Africa, 
particularly in 
the Horn, in the 
oil rich states 
and in the 
Sahel, which is 
regarded as a 
buffer zone 
between 
Maghreb and 
sub-Saharan 
Africa, as other 
contributions 
have brought 
out” 
(Abrahamsen, 
2004). 
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Most studies on Sahara-Sahelian terrorism focus on 
the historical development of terrorist groups 
(Larémont 2011, Emerson 2011), radical 
propaganda (Torres Sorianoa 2010, 2011), or the 
geopolitical challenges and counterterrorism 
measures (Cline 2007, Pham 2010). The 
confirmation of their ‘west African status’ is 
evident. The measures of countering terrorism in 
west African sub region should be the most 
important issues that will appear relevant in this 
discourse. 
It is on record, in 2012, “Islamist faction in Mali 
desecrating several tombs in the ancient city of 
Timbuktu, which in recent months fell under 
control of a separatist insurgency” (Ishaan, 2012). 
Looking at their destructive activities as “a divine 
order”. The Malian siege of the northern part by the 
Ansar ud deen,(or Ansar Dine) was an indication 
that there was a radical posture by the groups to 
demand for control of the state in line with their 
religious philosophy. The Boko Haram crisis is the 
latest in a long line of religious-inspired political 
violence that has arisen in the northern part of 
Nigeria and spilled over to chad, Niger, and the 
Cameroon republic. With a strong base and 
followership strength in the north-east Nigeria, the 
group “emerged in early 2000s as small Sunni 
Islamic group advocating a strict interpretation and 
implementation of Islamic Law in Nigeria”. 
(Blanchard, 2014). By 2009, this group had 
transformed into a violent group, after the 
government attacked members of the group in 
some major cities of northern Nigeria, (Shuaibu, 
Salleh, & Shehu, 2015) thereby declaring in July 
2010, “in a statement released to journalists that “jihad 
has begun” via Abubakar Shekau (Zenn 2013). Boko 
haram insurgency, “has continued to pose a serious 
threat to the country’s security system and the state 
existence as a single “corporate political entity” 
(Zenn, 2014). This also, has implications to sub-
regional security. The spill over effect, and the 
continued expansion of the groups violent attacks 
on citizens can now be seen to be spreading across 
the entire west African sub-region. Recently, 
northern part of Cameroun, and chad had 
experienced continued attacks and destructions of 
the populaces properties. 
From tangible evidences in the literature, (Obi, 
2006; Torres, 2010; Shuaibu, Salleh, & Shehu, 
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2015) as well as evolving trends of events in west 
Africa, there are raising cases of conflicts, which 
many scholars termed as terrorism. It is terrorism 
because of the nature and magnitude of how self-
acclaimed groups, particularly the so-called 
religious groups use force with sophisticated 
weapons to challenge the authorities in the 
respected states were these issues are manifest. The 
case of Boko Haram in Nigeria and some part of 
the Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the Ansar ud deen 
in Mali and the Movement pour l’unicité et le jihad 
en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) in Mali. 
The sub regional security challenges currently are 
that, with the velocity of these insurgent groups, in 
the sub-region, it is worrisome, and therefore holds 
many implications for ECOWAS to drive her 
economic integration programmes across the 
member states. Terrorism and destructive conflicts 
are bound to have a bush fire or contagious effects 
with the high possibilities of affecting the entire 
sub region. 
FOUR DECADE AFTER “INTEGRATION” - 
THE NEXT CHALLENGE? 
By what is next? The perception of this paper 
means that, the security issues and challenges 
which ECOWAS as a body is bound to face after 
fourty years of her creation, and after an innovative 
strategy to incorporate conflict resolution measures 
through multilateral action in Liberia, sierra Leone 
and Guinea Bissau in the 1990’s. With the post-
cold war security challenges faced by ECOWAS in 
1990 and beyond, the reality is that, security 
challenges and that of possible permeation of 
‘Terrorists’ activities, across west African states. 
Although there were many attempts to establish the 
sub region’s military command, but failed. It is 
undoubtful that the “wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea Bissau, and Ivory Coast have particularly 
retarded the attainment of ECOWAS objectives” 
(Miftah, 2008;3) in west African sub-region. 
However, the evolution of the military wing within 
the sub-region’s economic hub. the ECOMOG will 
do a lot of good to the sub-region, if member states 
of ECOWAS, can strategically re-design, 
strengthened and transform ECOMOG into 
becoming the sub-regions military high command, 
the ECOWAS Military Command (ECO-MILCO) 
The post-cold war conflicts in west Africa has 
given an insight to what the rebels groups and 
terrorist’ oriented groups can do to destabilise 
peace and security within. The book haram 
activities in Nigeria, Niger and Cameron; the 
Sahelian Islamises groups and their activities in 
Mali in particular, has revealed the dangers 
‘terrorism will unleash within the sub-region. As 
Obi rightly captures the situation that counter-
terrorist moves and supports from outside only 
came to “West Africa at the peak of the civil wars 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the funding of 
terrorist networks linked to al-Qaeda. Also, rebel 
groups reported to be operating in the northern 
fringes of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad have 
been linked to possible terrorist infiltration from 
North Africa. Such fears have been heightened by 
rebel activity in Chad with occasional incursions 
across Nigeria’s northeaster borders, by the Darfur 
crisis in Sudan, and by insurgency linked to Tuareg 
groups in Mali and Niger” (Obi, 2006). 
 Reflecting before the advent of the book haram 
insurgency, in 2003, we have witnessed the advent 
of a group referred to as “Taliban’ in north-east 
Nigeria, particularly in Borno and Yobe states. The 
group is believed to hold sympathy for the 
Taliban’s in Afghanistan, and to some extent 
“being affiliated to the Al Sunna Wal Jama, has 
been involved in attacks on police stations and 
other government offices and in the murder of 
police officers and civilians in 2004”. (Obi, 2006) 
The group was believed to be formed by the 
militant tertiary education students in northern part 
of Nigeria. 
 CONCLUSION 
The west African sub region had experienced series 
of crises, especially from the beginning of the 
1990s. These conflicts are detrimental to the region 
socially and development wise. The poverty issues, 
the refugee issues, bad governance and others are 
yet to be addressed, therefore paying less attention 
to terrorist manifestations within the region, will 
call for more destruction of the region, thereby 
amplifying the social and economic woes in the 
region.  
“The fragility of post-conflict West African states 
has contributed to the use of peace-building as part 
of the counter-terrorism process” (Obi, 2006). 
ECOWAS, learn from this premise, and came up 
abruptly with the ECOMOG model to take up the 
peace enforcement efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and other conflict areas. The challenges faced, was 
later addressed by a revision of her treaty in 1993  
To maintain 
international peace and 
security, and to that 
end take effective 
collective measures for 
the prevention and 
removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the 
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suppression of acts of 
aggression or other 
breaches of peace, and 
to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the 
principles of justice 
and international law, 
adjustments or 
settlements of 
international disputes 
or situations which 
might lead to breaches 
of [the] peace. (The 
United Nations 2007). 
Although the African Union, ‘failed’ to achieved 
the dream of raising a single military high 
command for Africa decades ago, despite her 
experience from the “Pan-African peacekeeping 
force that operated in Shaba Province of Congo 
(Kinshasa) in 1978–79; the Chadian operations 
(1979-82). she however, re-examined her security 
and peace agenda. It recognised the prevalence of 
destabilising conflicts that would seriously impede 
collective and individual efforts to realise the 
continent’s political and socioeconomic objectives 
(Cilliers & Malan, 2005). The ECOWAS should 
not relent, learn from such an experience of using 
the ECOMOG in peace building and forge ahead to 
have a regional standby military force (RMSF). 
 ECOMOG swift performance in west Africa, 
testifies to the fact that, regional groups can 
organise itself to fight such other groups with 
terrorist linings. Collectively fighting terrorist will 
lead to the defeat of the terrorism within the west 
African state. The joint military operations by the 
Nigerian - Cameroon and Nigeria - Chad, leading 
to the defeat of the Boko haram subsequently 
within these axis, is a clear indication that fighting 
terrorism collectively will defeat the terrorist 
groups in West Africa. 
The establishment of a permanent force, with a 
central command and structure for the west African 
states, will be a positive development in the right 
direction. This will avail the permanent standing 
military force the opportunity to have a many-sided 
common base for training and command structure, 
despite the language barrier and the cultural 
difference of the ECOWAS member state. This 
should be observed within the provision of “the 
mechanism” for peace and security protocol, as 
obtained in the ECOWAS 1993 revised treaty. 
Furthermore, the permanent standing Military force 
should be structured with each state having a unit 
of such a force in its military command, and be 
operated under the control of the Assembly of the 
Heads of state and government. 
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